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Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same number of interaction partners, or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we explore general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary spatial structures and social goods. We find that heterogeneous networks, wherein some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, can enhance the evolution of prosocial behaviors. However, they often accumulate most of the benefits in the hands of a few highly-connected individuals, while many others receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, selection can favor producers of social goods even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. In summary, heterogeneous structures have the ability to strongly promote the emergence of prosocial behaviors, but they also create the possibility of generating large inequality. 

We study a general setting of neutral evolution in which the population is of finite, constant size and can have spatial structure. Mutation leads to different genetic types (``traits"), which can be discrete or continuous. Under minimal assumptions, we show that the marginal trait distributions of the evolutionary process, which specify the probability that any given individual has a certain trait, all converge to the stationary distribution of the mutation process. In particular, the stationary frequencies of traits in the population are independent of its size, spatial structure, and evolutionary update rule, and these frequencies can be calculated by evaluating a simple stochastic process describing a population of size one (i.e. the mutation process itself). We conclude by analyzing mixing times, which characterize rates of convergence of the mutation process along the lineages, in terms of demographic variables of the evolutionary process.